SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY: NOTES ON RAPPROCHEMENT by Restivo, Sal P.
Sociology has been accused on one hand of lacking a "social
consciousness" and on the other hand of being a "humanity and not
a science" and on both counts it has to be stated that the criti-
cism is not unjust. We, as sociologists, have been struggling to
define sociology since its inception and as soon as one position
is stated it is attacked by those in the discipline holding the
opposite view. I, of course, do not intend to solve the problem
by pompously giving my opinion in an editorial preface, however
hopefully the articles selected for publication in this issue of
the KANSAS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY offer some insight into the use-
fulness of sociology both as a "humanity" and a "science."
First, Sal Restivo's article discusses how history and the
study of historical incidents will give the sociologist clues to
patterns in today's society. The next two articles by Francesco
Cordasco and Douglas Dean are an extension of Restivo's article
by depicting how social values of the dominant culture remain con-
stant over a historical span. The articles concern American
schools as social institutions which are not used as centers of
learning but instead as means of social control in molding minor-
ity children to become part of the dominant mass culture totally
disregarding individuality and .education. The articles both
point to the existence of this common factor of American educa-
tion over a historical period of 70 years and establish an obvi-
ous point in evaluating the American educational system. Thus,
we can distinguish the value of sociology in understanding a
social problem and possibly pointing toward corrections.
The final article by Lawrence Pettit and Paul Shaw deals with
the development of black paramilitary organizations. Again in
this paper we find constructive hints in understanding the
development of a social situation which forces a minority to re-
sort to extreme activities because of its threatened feelings.
Thus, the Pettit and Shaw article extend the thinking that a
science and a humanity do no t.ihave to be mutually exclusive
categories.
I only hope that this issue of the KANSAS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
can throw light in a few areas of knowledge and open many creaky
doors of intellectual curiosity.
Kenneth Anderson
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The bases for distinguishing between sociology and history
are examined and found to be insupportable insofar as the
subject matter of the two disciplines coincides. The dis-
tinctions between (1) ideographic and nomothetic science,
(2) art and science, and (3) humanism and science have been
used to justify separating historical from sociological
inquiry; in fact, these distinctions are not logically
relevant to identifying fields of inquiry. This argument
is supported by considering the logic of inquiry, as well
as by studying the research activities of historians and
sociologists. Rapprochement between history and ,sociology
is urged to erase logical contradictions, and to wed
humanistic and artistic concerns with the "science" of
sociological inquiry.
The emergence of sociology as a "super-history" (Collingwood, 1956: 12B)
in Comte's positive philosophy invited historians to put aside their methods
for those of the positivists. The rejection of this invitation followed from
a growing sense of autonomy among historians. Philological criticism provided
them with what they considered to be a unique method for a unique task - dis-
covering and stating the facts of history (Collingwood, 1956: 126-133). The
nature of the relationship between sociology and history is still confused
by the idea of a unique "historical method." Even contemporary scholars who
urge rapprochement take for granted that sociology and history are "mutually
dependent and yet ••• separated with respect to their immediate aim." (Mandel-
baum, 1967; see e.g. Cahnman and Boskoff, 1964: 1-18; Lipset, 1968: 23ff.)
In challenging the relevance of systematic generalization and cumulative
theory for history, historians have argued that historical methods cannot be
assimilated by scientific methods (Collingwood, 1956: 133). By contrast, the
historical perspective central to nineteenth and early twentieth century sociology
has gradually faded from the core of modern sociology. The result is that the
study of social facts has been theoretically impotent and historically impoverished.
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In supporting those scholars who cons~der sociology and history mutually
dependent we shall argue the stronger thesis that insofar as their subject matters
coincide the two "disciplines" cannot be meaningfully separated. 1
The Axiom of Uniquenesi
Wilhelm Windelband's (1915: 136-160) distinction between nomothetic and
ideographic inquiry has influenced generations of scholars. 3 It has generated
a mystique of uniqueness which continues to permeate the philosophy of his-
torical inquiry. As a basis for separating history and sociology this mystique
is, at times, manifested in the unreasonable rhetoric of anti-sociology:
History stands in grimly majestic contrast to the
puny weapons of the sociologist for measuring and clas-
sifying these facts; a Himalaya of iron and granite defying
a few feeble pick-axes (Nevins, 1962: 333).
More often the mystique is manifested in the timidity with which historians tread
in the shadow of physical scientists capable of deducing "causal laws of general
application." For example, in Clio, A ~1use Trevelyan cautioned that
It is the business of the historian to generalize and to
guess as to cause and effect, but he should do it modestly,
and not call it science ••• (1913: vi).
One even finds distinguished scholars like Raymond Aron (1961: 233) arguing that
history is the study of "facts ••• foreign to any rule. n
How facts can be organized and interpreted "modestly," as Trevelyan suggests,
is a mystery. Even more mysterious are the directives which would have us view
the facts of history as subject to no rules.
Every "fact" is in some sense unique. If the axiom of uniqueness is accepted,
generalizations wi~l not be anticipated; concepts will not be designed to reveal
patterns and regularities. Inevitably, the historian armed with such concepts
will conclude- that history is "a chain of unique phenomena," (Mannheim, 1936:
201). But uniqueness does not preclude order. To study facts is to interpret
the "chaotic diversity of our sense experience" in tenns of a "logically uniform
system of thought" which coordinates singularities with a theoretical structure
(Einstein, 1946: 443).
It is not entirely unreasonable that history and the social studies in general
have been plagued by a distrust of generalizations and of science. Such sentiments
are understandably nourished by the individual's consciousness of "uniqueness"
and "freedom."
If we are to avoid the absurd consequences of accepting the axiom of unique-
ness, personal consciousness must be transcended. Tolstoy (1957: 1443-4) offers
a simple but .instructive model in the closing paragraphs of War and Peace:
As wi.th astronomy the. difficulty in the way of
recognizing that the earth moves consisted in having
to rid oneself of the immediate sensation that the
earth was stationary accompanied by a similar sense
of planets' motion, so in history the obstacle in the
way of recognizing the subjection of the individual to
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the laws of space and time and causality lies in the difficulty
of renouncing one's personal impression of being independent of
those laws. But as in astronomy the new view said: "True, we are
not conscious of the movement of the earth but if we were to allow
that it is stationary we should arrive at an absurdity, whereas
if we admit the motion (which we do not feel) we arrive at laws,"
likewise in history the new theory says: "True, we are not conscious
of our dependence but if we were to allow that we are free we arrive
at an absurdity, whereas by admitting our dependence on the external
world, on time and on causality, we arrive at laws.
Modesty in inquiry readily degenerates into a defense of unsystematic inter-
pretation and "the adequacy of rule-af-thumb and common-sense methods." Indeed,
even rules-of-thumb and common-sense methods must be based on the assumption
of an underlying and discoverable order in nature (Barnes, 1963: 361). His-
torians cannot defend their descriptions and interpretations and at the same
time deny that human activity is determined. Where determinism in science be-
comes distorted by the ideologies and dogmas of positivism and scientism its
denial is defensible; otherwise it stands as the fundamental and necessary
"faith" of all scientists.
Art, Science, and Inquiry
Windelband, in challenging the conception of history as a science, reduced
it to a method for intuiting the value of the individual, "an activity on the
whole akin to that of the artist" (Collingwood, 1956: 165-8). Art and science
are not, however, "two separate and logically incompatible paths to under-
standing" (Hughes, 1960: 20). Art in inquiry refers to the intuitive and im-
aginative aspects of (1) selecting and formulating problems and (2) organizing,
presenting, and interpreting data. These aspects of inquiry defy systematic and
rigorous classification. They are what Kaplan (1964: 3-11) classifies as logics-
in-use, implicit cognitive styles which are more or less logical, and are as much
a part of inquiry as those practices explicitly formulated in a logical, idealized
manner, i.e., reconstructed logics. Indeed, for some scientists, inquiry proceeds
in the "'wildness of logic' where reason is the handmaiden and not the master"
(Morse, 1959: 58). .
If we consider the traditional role of the historian as the narrator of ~an's
past, it is evident that his narration does not reconstruct history .wie ~ ergentlich
gewesen (von Ranke, 1956: 57; see Collingwood, 1956: 130-1). "Imaginative re-
construction," a "re-creative or interpretive art"4 identical to the creation of a
work of art, bridges the gap between "history-as-actuality" and "knowable history"
(Gottscholk, 1963: vi). This artistic act has as its aim the construction of a
coherent past which "conveys an inner conviction" (Hughes, 1964: 47). It does not
therefore differ in kind from the act of "science," which involves coordinating facts
with theoretical structures "in such 'a way that the resulting coordination is co~
plete and convincing" (Einstein, 1946: 443). Every reconstruction or interpretation
is organized around a set of axioms or assumptions, definitions, and hypotheses
which are more or less systematic, more or less personal. The process of inquiry -
which, it should be stressed, is ultimately a col'lective search for knowledge and
not the work of isolated individuals - involves making these more explicit, more
systematic, and less personal. Unless we are prepared to defend the "art" of this
process as arbitrary, projective, entirely subjective and not subject to systematic
refinement, it must be conceived as an ~ntegral part of theory construction.
History and the World View of Sociology
Comte, Weber, Simmel and others in the classic tradition of sociology recognized
the relevance of history. The historical dimension which was an integral part of
their perspective faded with the emergence of a methodologically inhibited sociology
during the post-World War I years. In sDite of the influence of such heirs to the
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classic tradition as Mills, Bendix, and Eisenstadt, sociology especially
in America, remains vulnerable to criticism as parochial, oriented to
contemporary events, and characterized by a tendency to individualize social facts.
The validity of the perspectives of modern sociologists are not categorically defined;
but clearly they have failed to fulfill the promise of the classic tradition
(Mills, 1959; Stein and Vidich, 1963; Horowitz, 1965). Part of their failure
rests on a neglect of the social facts of history.
In the context of sociological inquiry, history is the record of man's past
organized as social facts. This set of social facts can be viewed as a source
and a testing ground for hypotheses, theories, and laws. 5 It also forms a nec-
essary part of the domain of inquiry in a discipline concerned with social change. 6
BY definition, sociology entails a view of man's history as a set of invariant
processes and sequences. To ignore this implication precludes not merely under-
standing and explaining historical phenomena but understanding and explaining
the present and future as history.]
Tt is not implied that such understanding and explanation will follow
immediately upon the sociologist's turning his attention to history. The gap be-
tween history-as-actuality and knowable history poses formidable methodological
and epistemological difficulties. The gap will never be narrowed unless the social
facts of history are subjected to cumulative study. It is important to emphasize
the functions of "theorizing" for revealing structures in history. As a process,
theorizing ideally can provide (1) closer and closer approximation to the facts
of history "as they really were" - one consequence of this process for the study
of history is that data which are not available empirically can be supplied
logically; (2) closer and closer approximation to a c~herent and convincing
interpretation of history. To realize these ends, the social facts of history
must be subject (1) to continuous interplay between theory and data and (2) to
continuous logical refinement of theory (see Cochran, 1964: 35).
The Classic Tradition: A Model for Unity
Sociology and history cannot be logically distinguished as disciplines. 8
Historians, however, often rely on their literary and humanistic traditions as
sufficient defense of their autonomy. The literary tradition in history assumes
a different quality once we have admdtted without qualification that historical
social facts can be studied "scientifically. If Verbal statements about social
facts in the common language are minimally abstract and systematic. The process
of inquiry involves the transformation of these statements into increasingly
precise statements, and ultimately into symbolic (e.g., mathematical statements.
The humanistic tradition retains its significance when we communicate the
description and interpretation of social facts to laymen. This in fact is one
of the moral imperatives entailed in the humanistic tradition. The humanistic
tradition, by any measure, is stronger in history than in sociology. It is by
no means universally evident in the work of historians. They have not escaped
the criticisms leveled at sociologists for making social analysis remote, ir-
relevant, and useless. 9
Only if humanism is used as an excuse for shoddy methods and non-cumulative
research can it be defined as a distinguishing characteristic of history or,
for that matter, of any discipline.
There is no need to search for a new and exotic organization of sociological
inquiry to integrate our arguments for rapprochement. If we are courageous enough
to ignore Whitehead's apothegm (1959: 162) that "a science which hesitates to
forget its founders is lost," historians and sociologists alike can, following
Mills, cultivate the vision of classic social analysis. In the biographies of
Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and others in the classic tradition, sociological inquiry
exhibits a concern for "historical social structures" and a focus on problems
directly relevant "to urgent public issues and insistent human troubles" (Mills,
1959: 21). Weber (1947: 109) in particular integrates these various virtues:
a concern for historical social structures as a logical means to understanding
man's present and future conditions, uncompromising analyses, and choice of
subject matter guided always by a "profound personal connnitment to the cause of
reason and freedom" (Bendix, 1960: 30f).
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The new generation of historians and sociologists is being exposed to a
"strategy in social sciences" (Moore, 1963: 66-95) rooted in these biographies.
This strategy defines a sociological inquiry based on.a history informed by
theory, a sociology informed by history, and a social science informed by humanism.
Conclusion
Two major texts in history and sociology have appeared during the past
several years; Sylvia Thrupp, as editor of Comparative Studies in Society and
History, has pioneered. a forum for social history and historical sociology.
These are among many indications that sociologists and historians are at least
becoming more aware of a mutual dependence. These trends are not so general
that we can easily discern or take for granted their directions and outcomes.
In urging a radical rapprochement it is not intended that the reality of the
distinct academic traditions of sociology and history be ignored. It is in-
conceivable, however, that continuity can be built into the study of social facts
as long as historians and sociologists remain committed to an untenable separation
of aims, and blind to their common task.
Footnotes
IThis conclusion follows from the arguments for a theoretical history and
for rapprochment between sociology and history. In addition to works cited
in the text the following works are especially relevant: Eliot, 1922: 628-636;
Thrupp, 1957: 11; "What History and Sociology Can Learn from Each Other,"
Sociology. and Social Research, 41 (1957), pp. 434-438; Hofstadter, 1956: 365f; Dilthey,
1962; Berr, 1956: 250-255; Carr, 1963: 84; Popper, 1961. Our focus on "social
facts" should not obscure the general implications of our argument for the
relationships between' history and the other social sciences.
2This phnase is Fritz Wagner's, cited in Anderle, 1965: 36.
3Nagle's treatment of this issue is espeically lucid and includes exemplary
illustrations from the natural sciences: Ernest Nagel, 1961: 547ff. See also
Andlerle's critique of the axiom of uniqueness in Anderle, 1965: 36ff, and Carl
G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," (1965: 231-242).
4 .
Louis Gottschalk, 1963: vi. Croce argued that history is not a science;
it is an art, and it is more than art. The historian must state what he sees as
the artist does; but the historian, unlike the artist, must assure himself that what
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he sees is truth (Collingwood, 1956: 190-4). Droysen included history among the
sciences, but argued that it was the only science which was also required to
be an art; John Droysen, "Art and Method," an essay published as an appendix
to the first regular edition of the Outline £f the Principles of History (1968),
reprinted in Stern (1965: 139). Wedgwood, following Trevelyan, considers history
an art guided by "imaginative insight": See C. v. Wedgewood's essay in "Historical
Writing" (1965). The debate on this issue has been less critical in sociology;
but see Robert A. Nisbet, 1962: 67-74.
5For an illustration of the type of research this concept of history entails,
see the monograph by Leo Lowenthal and Marjorie Fiske, "The Debate Over Art and
Popular Culture in Eighteenth Century England," (1957: 33-112). The authors
"approached the historical materials of eighteenth century England with categories,
questions, and hypotheses derived from the contemporary study of mass media of
communication (Komarovsky, 23£.).
6See, for example, the argument for the sociological analysis of social - i.e.,
historical - change, by S. D. Clark, 1959: 389-400. A paradigm for this approach
to social change in Crane Brinton, 1965: esp. 3-26.
7Mills (1959: 146) quotes Paul Sweezy in defining historical sociology as
"an attempt to write 'the present as history. 'If On the future of history,
Heilbroner's ideas (1960) are compatible with Mills': "When we estrange ourselves
from history we do not enlarge, we diminish ourselves, even as individuals .•.• We
cannot help living history. We can only fail to be aware of it. '-'
8Unless the fallacy of autonomy is recognized - both in terms of the preceding
arguments and the discussion which follows - the strategy of philosophical arguments
concerning the nature of historical explanation is of dubious value. This is
especially true when such arguments become detached from the problems we have
focused on. The Popper-Hempel "theory of historical explanation," for example,
does little to clarify issues that will stimulate the meaningful study of .social
facts, and is more likely to prompt anti-posi.tivist critiques (such as Alan
Donagan, "Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered," 1965:
esp. 24-25.
9See, for example, the essays by C. V. Wedgwood, and Geoffrey Barraclough
(1965). See also Anderle's comments on t.he "new pragmatic attitude" in history;
which is in many respects analogous to the "new sociology."
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